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THE "SAFE" DANGER: REMEDIES UNDER THE
AMENDED VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
There has been much debate over what actually was conferred
upon minorities when they were given the right to vote in 1870.1
The debate centers upon whether the right to vote consists solely of
the ability to participate equally in elections,' or whether it comprises
the right to elect.3 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 4 passed in order
to prevent discrimination in the voting process,5 has, if anything,
Racial minorities were given the right to vote in 1870 as a result of the adoption
of the Fifteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The debate leads to the issue
of whether the right to vote should include efforts to "create districts that favor the
election of blacks, Latinos and other minorities" so that the right to vote actually would
include the right to elect. Ronald Brownstein, Minority Quotas in Elections?, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, at Al.
2 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-69 (1964) (holding that all citizens, as
individuals, have the constitutional right to equal legislative representation).
I See John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional
Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 167 (1984). Low-Beer argues that the meaning of
"equal representation" as used in Reynolds v. Sims has shifted from the concept of "one
person, one vote" to "the representation of communities, a minority representation
interest that coexists uncomfortably with Reynolds' formulation of the principle of
majority rule." Id. (emphasis added); see Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority
Interests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1135, 1145-46
(1993). The contributions of minorities in elections cannot be realized if they do not
elect minority representatives. Guinier states that "people participate in competitive
elections . . . not simply to win a contested seat in the legislature, but to have their
ideas and interests represented." Id. at 1145. Accordingly, Guinier explains that
minority votes casted for minority candidates who lose the election are "empty" votes.
Id. at 1146.
4 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
See id. The Act in relevant part, provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice of procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color ....
Id. When a jurisdiction intends on changing its electoral system, it must inform the
Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of the
change and prove its nondiscriminatory nature. Shawn Fremstad, State Judicial Elections
and the Voting Rights Act: Defining the Proper Remedial Scheme, 76 MINN. L. REV.
101, 107 n.26 (1991) (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1, 51.10 (1990)). "The Voting Rights Act
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fueled the debate.' In order to stop the persistent institutions that
deprived minorities of access to the ballot,7 the Act created "stringent
new remedies for voting discrimination where it persist[ed] on a
pervasive scale, and in addition the statute strengthen[ed] existing
remedies for pockets of voting discrimination. "'
The Act was amended in 1982, and since then, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the remedy for Voting Rights Act violations to
be one of "safe districting."9 Safe districting has been used as a tool
to increase minority representation.'° However, safe districting has
been met with sharp criticism." There are fundamental problems
with intentionally creating a district for the purpose of electing
was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which
has infected the electoral process. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
308 (1966).
6 See ABIGAIL M. THERNsTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND MINoRITY VOTING RIGHTs 233-44 (1987). The Voting Rights Act has been
referred to as an unconstitutional form of affirmative action. id.; see Alexander A.
Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote With the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1810, 1835 (1992). "The Voting Rights Act as it is now enforced conflicts with
the right to vote. . . [by using] safe districting as a means of achieving racial justice.
. . [and using] racial gerrymandering as a remedy for minority vote dilution claims
conflicts .... " Id.
7 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311. "Grandfather clauses were invalidated in Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 [1915], and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 [1915].
Procedural hurdles were struck down in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 [1939] ...
Racial gerrymandering was forbidden by Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 [1960]."
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
9 "Safe districting" has been defined by most courts as the creation of a district in
which the majority race constitutes at least 65% of the population of that district. See,
e.g., Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1147, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(concluding that 65 % is a generally accepted threshold for providing an opportunity for
minorities to elect a representative of their choice); Miss. v. United States, 490 F. Supp.
569, 575 (D.D.C. 1979) (concluding that "a district should contain a black population
of at least 65 percent . . . to provide black voters with an opportunity to elect a
candidate of their choice"), aff'd mem., 444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
o See Brownstein, supra note 1, at Al.
See Guinier, supra note 3, at 1135 (rejecting race conscious districting as a means
of remedying the limited ability of black voting strength); see also Alan Howard &
Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the Emerging
Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1616 (1983) (arguing that safe
districting infringes on the constitutional guarantee that all citizens have the right to
participate in elections on an equal basis).
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officials who are of the same race as their constituents,12 despite the
fact that safe districting may in fact increase the number of
representatives who are "minority sensitive." 3
This Note will compare the possible advantages of safe
districting with its encroachments on an individual's right "to
participate in elections on an equal basis."' 4 Part I discusses the
Supreme Court's progression towards reaching the conclusion that
safe districting is a permissible remedy for providing minorities with
their "'fair share' such as votes ... and mechanisms to persuade and
-influence. "s Part I will also show how recent developments, such as
the decisions in Shaw v. Reno16 and Holder v. Hall, 7 may indicate
the Court's willingness to abandon safe districting. Part II applies the
constitutional norm of "political equality"' 8 under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the practice of safe districting. Additionally, this Part
will analyze the right to vote as both a group and an individual right,
and will reject the use of safe districting as an artificial means to
create a more proportionally representative legislature. Part III will
advocate the use of a more traditional alternative to safe districting,
and will analyze proposed alternatives such as "Single-Transferable
Voting" and "Proportional Interest Representation." These
alternatives have been proposed by scholars as methods of reconciling
12 See generally Yanos, supra note 6, at 1814 (stating that there is "significant
tension between the individual's right to an equally weighted vote and the policy of safe
districting . . . . In addition, safe districting conflicts with recent equal protection
jurisprudence, which has called into question the use of racial classifications in the
legislative process.").
11 See Howard & Howard, supra note 11, at 1629-30 (arguing that safe districting
is advantageous because it increases the likelihood of "elect[ingl a person-black or
white-who will represent the interests of black voters").
14 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
15 Guinier, supra note 3, at 1140.
16 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
'7 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
IS Howard & Howard, supra note 11, at 1616-17 (stating that political. equality
guarantees all citizens the right "to participate in elections on an equal basis").
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single-member voting districts 9 and proportional representation, with
the Constitution.
I. The Trend Towards Safe Districting
and Recent Developments
In Reynolds v. Sims, 2" the Supreme Court proclaimed that the
right to vote is an individual one.21 Writing for a majority of the
Court, Chief Justice Warren explained that "'state election systems
...should be designed to give approximately equal weight to each
vote cast."' The Court therefore rejected the State of Alabama's
apportionment scheme because its single-member districts were of
substantially unequal size. 3 The Court found that the votes that were
cast in districts of low populations were worth more than those in
more populous districts.24
Further, the Court found that the rights asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 25 are
"individual and personal in nature. "26 The Court stated that
"[liegislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters not . . . cities or economic interests." 27 Although
"' Single-member voting districts are districts in which only one representative is
elected for that district. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member
Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 n.23 (1991). Multi-member
districts are districts in which more than one representative is elected for that district.
Id.
10 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
21 See id. at 558 (reasoning that each person, individually, is entitled to a vote in
putting forth the constitutional principle of "one person, one vote").
I Id. at 564 n.40 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569-71 (1946) (Black,
J., dissenting)).
23 Id. at 586-87.
24 Id. at 568 (holding that the district court properly found all three of Alabama's
reapportionment plans to be constitutionally invalid because none apportioned votes on
a population basis).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Id.
26 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561.
27 Id. at 562.
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the number of constituents in each of the districts in a state may not
be exactly equal,2" the Court held that a state is required by the Equal
Protection Clause to "make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is
practicable. 2 9 The Court recognized the impracticality of drawing
district lines so that each had an identical number of voters,3" but also
warned that it would not tolerate a districting plan that had anything
more than the "minor variations" from the equal-population
principle.3"
The Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982, in response to
the "one person, one vote" doctrine and the Court's recognition of
every citizen's right to obtain electoral influence.32 The amended Act
prohibited any state practice which resulted in members of a minority
group having "less opportunity . . to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."" Consequently,
2 Id. at 577. The Court stated that "[mlathematical exactness or precision is hardly
a workable constitutional requirement." Id.
29 Id. at 577.
0 Id.
31 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579. "So long as the divergences from a strict population
standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
state policy, some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally
permissible." Id.; see Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329-30 (1973) (holding
constitutional a legislative apportionment plan that had deviations of at least 16.4% from
mathematical exactness); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161-63 (1970) (rejecting
a 24.78% deviation in the size of the state representative districts); Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) ("Equal representation for equal numbers of people
is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access
to elected representatives.").
32 See Guinier, supra note 3, at 1144-45.
33 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (emphasis added). The amended text, in relevant
part, provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of
race.. ..
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if...
it is shown that the political process leading to nomination or election
in the State.. . are not equally open to participation by members of
a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) ... in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
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where the previous remedy for violations in the 1960s might have
been a judicially-altered system to create voting districts of equal
population"4 -during the years leading to the amendments, and the
years since-safe districting became the primary remedy for
violations of the Act." Safe districting evidenced a shift in the
Court's focus towards not only equal access to the ballot box, but
also towards proportional minority representation.3 6  The Court's
reasoning was based on a perception that the only way to achieve
"full and effective"'37 minority representation is to nearly guarantee a
win for the minority candidate of choice.3" As a result, safe
districting has become a prevalent practice in jurisdictions that seek
to gain the required preclearance from the Attorney General under the
Act.
39
Even before the 1982 amendments, the Supreme Court
advocated the use of measures similar to safe districting as the means
of providing members of a minority group, whether political or
racial, with greater influence in elections." In 1971, the Court took
a firm countermajoritarian stance in Gordon v. Lance4' by holding
that the Constitution did not "require[] that the majority always
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice .... Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.
Id.
See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1818.
S See id. at 1822.
• Id. at 1821-22. "Ironically, proportional representation has become the de facto
standard despite the fact that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982,
explicitly prohibits its use ... ." Id.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
See generally Robert Barnes, Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Results, and
Proportional Representation. What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation of Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1252 (1985) (arguing that safe
districting guarantees that minorities will be elected).
" See Howard & Howard, supra note 11, at 1622. "[Slafe districting has
increasingly become important because it will almost certainly be an element in most
remedial orders directed at jurisdictions found in violation" of the amended Act. Id. at
1626.
o See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v: Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161-62
(1977); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
' 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
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prevail on every issue." 42 In Gordon, even though there was a sixty
percent voting requirement to pass a referendum, the Equal
Protection Clause was found not to be violated because the provision
at issue did not "discriminate against or authorize discrimination
against any identifiable class. ,43 In United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,44 the Court conclusively held that
measures similar to safe districting for racial minorities violated
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the prohibition of racial
discrimination in the franchise that is found in the Fifteenth
Amendment. 45 The Court further explained that a state should "arrive
at . . . [a percentage] . . . necessary . . . to ensure the opportunity
for the election of a black representative." 46 The Court ruled, in
effect, that safe districting was constitutional and was the proper
remedy for unequal representation.47
After the amendments, the Act has been interpreted as
somewhat of a quota plan to afford certain guarantees that a fair
number of minorities will be elected. 4' However, there has been an
argument over whether the amendments necessarily require the
creation of minority districts in order to elect minorities.49 In Shaw
v. Reno,5" the Court recognized the possible unconstitutionality of
intentionally drawing majority and minority districts.5" In Shaw, the
North Carolina Legislature submitted a districting plan to the
42 Id. at 6. Although the Court found that "any departure from strict majority rule
gives disproportionate power to the minority," it upheld a 60% voting requirement. Id.
4 Id. at 7.
4430 U.S. 144 (1977).
4 Id. at 161.
4Id. at 162.
47 Id. at 161.
'8 Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2592 (1994) (Thomas J., concurring); see
Brownstein, supra note 1, at Al. "mhe Act has grown into something entirely
different. ... [Wie have converted the Act into a device for.., apportioning political
power among racial and ethnic groups." Id. The new element in districting has been
"legal mandates that require unprecedented efforts to create districts that favor the
election of blacks, Latinos, and other minorities." Id. "'The new rule is that... where
you can draw a minority district, you must .... .- Id. (quoting Laughlin McDonald,
Southern Regional Director of the American Civil Liberties Union) (emphasis added).
"9 See Brownstein, supra note 1, at Al.
'o 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
"I Id. at 2824.
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Attorney General for approval. 2 The districting plan, however, was
rejected on the basis that it only included one majority-black district
in the state.5 3 The Attorney General believed that under the
requirements of the amended Act, the North Carolina plan did not
"'give effect to black. . . voting strength' . . . by using boundary
lines 'no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed
plan. '54
The North Carolina Legislature's revised plan included a
second majority-black district, which was abnormally shaped in order
to capture scattered black voters in the region. 5 The district was so
peculiar looking that it inspired poetically descriptive comments from
the people who both opposed and favored the new district.56 Perhaps
the most significant of these comments was issued by the author of
the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who wrote that
the district "winds in snake-like fashion through tobacco country,
financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbles in enough
enclaves of black neighborhoods."' 57  The plan was held
unconstitutional because the district appeared to be created solely on
racial bases, without any regard to geographical or political
boundaries.5" The Court focused on the fact that because the district
was so oddly shaped, it must have been drawn with obvious intent to
create a majority-minority district.59 This, O'Connor stated, in an
52 1d. at 2817.
I id. at 2819-20.
Id. at 2820 (quoting app. to Brief for Federal Appellees l0a-lla).
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
"'You could drive down 1-85 with both doors open and kill everybody in the
district."' David Van Biema, A Controversial Supreme Court Decision on Racial
Redistricting Uncovers a Can of Worms. Or is it a String of Pearls?, TIME, July 12,
1993, at 31 (quoting North Carolina State Representative Mickey Michaux). Supporters
of the district have described it as "a string of pearls." Id. "Ask not for whom the line
is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have
Been Right if He Had Said: "When it Comes to Redistricting, Race isn't Everything, It's
the Only Thing?," 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1261 & n.96 (1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
57 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-77
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Id. at 2827.
59 Id. at 2826-27; see Stuart Taylor, Jr., Race: The Most Divisive Issue, N.J. L.J.,
Aug. 23, 1993, at 10, 12-13.
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emotionally charged opinion, bore an "uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid."' Consequently, the Court invalidated the plan
because the separation of voters into different districts on the basis of
race lacked "sufficient justification. "61
Shaw was a step back in the policy of advocating race-
conscious districting" because it questioned the justification for using
race as a factor when drawing district lines in general.6 Therefore,
Shaw has been feared to indicate an American consensus that racial
preferences should not be permitted in shaping legislative districts."
Liberals anticipate that, as a result of the decision in Shaw, many
cases will be brought against plans that include irregularly shaped
districts, and that an all out attack on racially motivated districting
will be waged.6" The question of whether the liberals' fears will be
realized can be answered only by time itself.
In Holder v. Hall,' the Court had yet another chance to
define the mandates of the amended Act. In Holder, six black voters
from Bleckley County, Georgia challenged the size of the county
governing body under the Voting Rights Act.6 ' The plaintiffs alleged
that the body's present size-one commissioner-diluted minority
voting power.68 The plaintiffs further alleged that black votes were
being intentionally diluted because, although the Georgia Legislature
had authorized the County to adopt a multi-member commission with
five commissioners, Bleckley County did not adopt such a change. 9
Vote dilution was alleged by the plaintiffs because, while blacks
constituted nearly twenty percent of the voting population in the
County, they had little chance of electing a candidate of their
60 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
6tId. at 2832.
See Taylor, supra note 59, at 10.
Van Biema, supra note 56, at 31.
See Neil A. Lewis, Voting Rights Case: A Divided Court Reflects Some Unresolved
Racial Issues, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1993, at A12.
' See Van Biema, supra note 56, at 32.
6 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
67 Id. at 2584.
" Id. at 2584-85.
6 Id. at 2584.
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preference. 7' The district court in Holder71 held for the defendants,
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a violation of the
Act. 72 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
after which the Supreme Court granted certioriari.74
Justice Kennedy announced the judgment for the thoroughly
divided Court,7 ' holding for the defendants.76 The essence of
Kennedy's opinion was that a "plaintiff cannot maintain a section 2
challenge to the size of a government body" because of a lack of
standards to provide "acceptable principles for deciding future
cases."77 Justice Kennedy found it irrelevant that a majority of the
other counties in Georgia had adopted five-member commissions.78
He, therefore, concluded that Bleckley County's failure to adopt a
five-member commission said "nothing about the effects that the sole
commissioner system has on the voting power of Bleckley County's
citizens. '7" Justice Kennedy's opinion thus avoided the issue of
whether minority voters are constitutionally entitled to elect
candidates of their choice.
Justice Thomas, however, did not avoid that issue. Rather,
he chose to attack the Court's interpretation of both Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act,80 and the meaning of a fully "effective" vote.8"
0 Id.
7 Hall v. Holder, 757 F. Supp. 1560 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
' Id. at 1584.
7' Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1574 (11th Cir. 1992).
74 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993).
" Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2583. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part
and in the judgment. Id. at 2588. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joined,
wrote an opinion concurring in thejudgment. Id. at 2591. Justice Blackmun with whom
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined, filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 2619, as
did Justice Ginsburg, id. at 2624. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion, in which
Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2625.
76 Id. at 2588.
77 Id.
' Id. at 2586. "It makes little sense to say . that the sole commissioner system
should be subject to a dilution challenge if it is rare-but immune if it is common." Id.
79 Id.
so Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2591 (Thomas, J., concurring).
I d. at 2594. Justice Thomas was severely criticized as a result of his attacks. See
John Leo, Clarence Thomas Deserves Honors; Not Irate Criticism, COLUMBIAN, Aug.
19, 1994, at A9. Ted Shaw, the director of the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund accused
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In his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated that he believed that the
Act had been converted into a judicial tool for allocating political
power among racial groups in order to achieve racially proportional
representation, rather than being implemented in order to achieve its
original goals of eradicating racially discriminatory obstacles to the
ballot.82 Thomas thoroughly rejected the Court's view that the only
votes which are effectively cast are those which control a seat in an
elected body.83 He recognized the infirmity in the Court's assumption
that minorities are truly "represented" only when a representative of
the same minority status has been elected." The premise of Justice
Thomas's argument, which he pleaded for his brethren to accept, was
the "inescapable fact that, in a majoritarian system, numerical
minorities lose elections. "85 In the most passionate section of his
opinion, Justice Thomas urged the Court to abandon its theories that
"race defines political interest," and that minorities "must have their
own 'minority preferred' representatives holding seats in elected
bodies if they are to be considered represented at all." 86
As a result of the Court's decision to hear cases such as
Holder and Shaw, and the actual opinions in those cases, the 1994-95
term is expected to be a "watershed for race relations."87 One
advocate of Justice Thomas's views proclaimed that "[t]he way to get
beyond racism . . . is categorically to denounce it, not to practice it
as a form of reparations or atonement for the sins of our ancestors. "88
Hopefully, this proclamation will not fall upon deaf ears, but rather
will help to reaffirm the notion that the Constitution is color blind.
Thomas of being as "'hostile to the Voting Rights Act as it has been construed.'" Id.
(quoting Ted Shaw). After digesting Thomas's opinion, Congressional Representative
John Lewis exclaimed that it was "'the silliest thing I ever heard of.'" Id. (quoting Rep.
John Lewis, D-Ga.).
Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2592 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83 id. at 2595.
4Id.
U Id. at 2596.
Id. at 2597.
See Bruce Fein, A Case for Rejecting Racial Preference, LEGAL TIMES, Oct.
10, 1994, at 26.
8 id.
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II. The Constitution, as Applied to Safe Districting
The Fifteenth Amendment expressly prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race in the franchise. 9 Congress was given the
authority to enforce the Amendment by the legislative means that it
deems appropriate. 9° But what are the confines of that authority? It
would seem logical that Congress is limited by the Constitution.9"
However, what may seem very logical in theory can be quite
different in practice. As discussed above, the guarantee of the right
to vote has been given different connotations through the years.'
Now that the Court, through recent decisions, and Congress, by
amending the Voting Rights Act, have all but required safe districting
as a necessary component of a re-apportionment plan,93 the following
question has been raised: How does the policy of safe districting,
which is drawing district lines solely on the basis of race, reconcile
with the Constitution?
The theory behind safe districting is premised on a different
perception of what the Reynolds Court found to be the right to vote. '
Requiring a district to be safe, therefore providing "meaningful
legislative representation" 95 when minorities in the district constitute
the majority of the constituents, treats the right to vote as being
different than it has previously been treated. 9' No more conclusive
" See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 9 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.
1992).
go U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
91 See U.S. CONST. art. I.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 1-13.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 34-87.
9 See generally Yanos, supra note 6, at 1821 (stating that the "one person, one vote"
doctrine did not guarantee empowerment of minority groups since the court moved
towards safe districting).
" Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1136-37 (1991). Since 1982, when
the Voting Rights Act was amended, a "meaningful" vote has taken the meaning of being
a vote for a "viable minority preferred representative." Id. at 1094.
9 See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1836. "[Rjacial gerrymandering as a remedy...
conflicts with an individual's right both to an equally weighted vote and to 'fair and
effective' representation .... " Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
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evidence of this change in treatment can be found other than in the
text of the amended Voting Rights Act.97 Section 2 creates the right
for "members of a class of [protected] citizens" to have equal
"opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their choice."98 Even
though the text of the amendments refers to the right to vote as
remaining in the individual because it refers to "members" of a class,
the Court has not applied the amendments as such.99
Congress, by amending the Voting Rights Act, consciously
moved away from the "one person, one vote" doctrine, because it
believed that it would not successfully lead to the empowerment of
minority groups.'0° . Equal votes for equal numbers of people,
according to Congress, gave the racial majority enough power in
voting systems of majority rule to effectively deny the racial minority
a "fair share or a fair opportunity.""'a° The opportunity could be
denied if the racial majority also happened to be the majority of
constituents in all of the districts in a state because there would be no
guarantee that even one minority candidate would gain a seat in the
election."°2 Therefore, the concern that minority candidates would
not be elected ushered remedial policies into an age of safe
districting.' Advocates of such districting believe that anything
short would be a futile attempt to try to "'provide . . . [minorities]
.. with a realistic opportunity"' of winning an election.14
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
See Howard M. Shapiro, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and
the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1984). It has been noted that whatever
the Act does protect against, it far exceeds protection solely against the individual's right
to register and vote. Id.
t0o See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1821.
101 Guinier, supra note 3, at 1143.
1 2 See id. (arguing that the "one person, one vote" principle gives the majority race
a tremendous advantage over minority races; so much of an advantage that the majority
effectively receives all the power); see also Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the
Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Wy Won't it Go Away?, 33
UCLA L. REV. 257, 279 (1985) (concluding that majority rule is unfair because even
a strong minority presence of 49% in a district still may not receive representation).
10 See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1822.
1o4 Barnes, supra note 38, at 1206 (quoting Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1413
(7th Cir. 1984)).
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Other questions must then be asked: Does the Constitution
require that candidates, in general, have a realistic opportunity to
win? Are minority candidates entitled to win a certain number of
seats that they might not have won if the systems did not insure such
a result? These become important questions because if answered in
the negative, a voting system, which is statutorily or judicially
imposed, and based upon safe districting, may not be reconcilable
with the "supreme law of the land."' 5
Answering the questions above requires an analysis of the
rights of individuals against the rights of groups with respect to the
right to vote.10 6  The invasion of safe districting was not an
accident.107 On the contrary, the shift away from the "one person,
one vote" doctrine was a deliberate decision, as evidenced by the
amendments to the Act itself.108 The amendments changed the test
for violations from being "purpose" oriented" to being "results"
oriented. °10 The original focuses of the Act were to prevent unequal
access to the ballot by prohibiting obstacles that would be placed in
105 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
'o See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1816. Yanos argues that:
Reynolds and its progeny established the principle that districting
schemes must provide all individuals an equal chance to participate
effectively in elections. Under the Voting Rights Act, courts and the
Department of Justice now have begun to require that districting
plans afford groups an equal opportunity to participate effectively,
through the use of safe districting. However, the practice of safe
districting makes excessive use of racial classifications, which the
Court has disfavored in recent equal protection cases involving
affirmative action. In addition, the group-based theory of
representation embodied in the policy of safe districting is in conflict
with the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as the
guarantor of voting rights on an individual basis.
Id.
107 See Howard & Howard, supra note 11, at 1615. The suggestion is that it was
Congress' intention that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act would "ensure[
that safe districting will be employed" in order to comply with the Act. Id. at 1616.
'06 See Barnes, supra note 38, at 1243.
109 The "purpose" test was defined in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980),
where the plurality opinion stated that violations of the Act could not be proved unless
the plan was "'conceived or operated as [al purposeful devic[e] to further racial
discrimination."' Id. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1970)).
110 See Barnes, supra note 38, at 1243.
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the way of registration of minorities,' t and to prevent unequal
numbers of constituents in districts that would serve to make a black
vote mathematically less than a white vote.1"2 Although before 1982
the Act focused on individuals rather than "class[es]," tt3 it is clear
that the amendments created a significant amount of importance on
a "group-based" right to vote. 1 '
The group-based theory of effective representation presumes
that individual-based systems are defective because they do not
provide for representatives that are of the same racial background as
those who elected them. 1 ' At the foundation of this presumption is
the concept that racial minorities in racial majority districts will
receive insufficient representation because the groups are dissimilar
in their candidate choices, thus reducing the racial minority's
influence to non-existence."16 Therefore, to prevent "wasting" the
vote of the individual voter, members of the same racial minority are
combined into one district based upon nothing other than their race. 117
However, by consciously creating districts for a certain race, and
subordinating the interests of individual voters who are not of that
race, both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendment are
necessarily implicated. 1 8
Treating one person differently than another solely on the
"account of race,"' 9 is precisely what the two Amendments
... See supra text accompanying note 8.
112 See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1822.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
114 See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1822.
" Id.
16 See Bruce Fein, Testing Apartheid for U.S. Electorate, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 28,
1993, at G1. However, as Fein points out, "[a] necessary corollary . . .is that whites
in majority black districts are reduced to futility because their skin color" does not match
that of the majority race. Id.
117 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) (finding that a majority
black district was created solely on the basis of the race of the constituents "regardless
of their age, economic status, or the community in which they live").
118 See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1841-42.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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prohibit. 120  The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits
abridgement of a citizen's right to vote on the basis of race, and the
Fourteenth Amendment reinforces that prohibition by guaranteeing
equality under the law to all citizens, whether they are members of
the racial majority or minority. '2  However, when subordinating the
racial majority voters' interests by favoring the interests of the racial
minority, there is unequal weight placed on each of these votes. 22
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments themselves do not refer
to "members of a class," but merely refer to individual "citizens.""
The Amendments, with respect to the right to vote, were adopted to
prevent discrimination against a person in the franchise. 24
Furthermore, history supports the notion that fundamental rights,
such as the right to vote, are inherently individual. 125 This right to
vote is comprised of the right to have equal access to the ballot and
the right to have equal weight placed on each individual's vote. 12
The amended Voting Rights Act, as it has been applied, has
had the effect of requiring the racial make-up of the legislature to be
roughly proportional to the racial make-up of society. 27 When the
Attorney General invalidates a plan such as the one which was first
submitted in Shaw, it is to effectively increase the number of minority
'20 The Equal Protection Clause gives citizens the right to an equally weighted vote.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557-58 (1964). The Fifteenth Amendment bans all
intentional racial discrimination in the voting process. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
121 U.S. CONST. amends. XIV & XV.
", See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1842-43.
'23 See id.
124 See id. Cf. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61 (stating that "one person, one vote" is
the standard required by the Amendments).
"2 See William B. Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Righis: The Legacy of Brown,
93 YALE L.J. 995, 996 (1984) (citing Professor Chester Finn of Vanderbilt University,
speaking before a congressional subcommittee in support of a bill to amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, which would extend the life of the Commission on Civil Rights).
'2' See supra text accompanying notes 7, 22-24.
'7 See Brownstein, supra note 1, at A2. "'What you are getting ...[from the
amended Act] . . . is a rather myopic view that you must have the same number of seats
held by minorities as is represented by their share of the population.'" Id. (quoting
William B. Reynolds, head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division during the
Reagan administration).
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representatives that are elected from that state. 2 Since there is a
lack of minority representatives, and a certain percentage of the
constituents are of the same minority status, there is the feeling that
there should be a certain percentage of minority representatives. 29
But where can the requirement be found that there be any racial
minorities in the legislature, let alone enough minorities? 30 Therein
lies the basis for stating that safe districting is a euphemism for
proportional representation.
1 31
The "Dole Compromise"1 32 was attached to the 1982
amendments in order to inform covered jurisdictions that "nothing in
this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. "'3
However, the result has been contrary to the words of the
Compromise. 34 Although there is not an exact fraction of the
legislature that must be filled by members of certain minority groups,
a coherent proportional type of system has nonetheless been fashioned
as the remedy for vote dilution. 135  The Supreme Court has been
's See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133-38 (finding that the districting plan
was rejected by the Attorney General because the city could not show black electoral
success was maximized). See generally Guinier, supra note 3, at 1135-37 (stating that
safe districting will increase the probability of black electoral success but the only way
to ensure a procedurally fair system is to eliminate majority rule systems and implement
new remedial schemes).
'9 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
30 See Howard & Howard, supra note 11, at 1630 (recognizing the argument that
because no political minority in the country has a right to representation proportionate
to its numbers, blacks should not either).
" See generally Yanos, supra note 6. at 1812-13 (arguing that districting plans
where certain districts are set aside as being "safe" will result in proportional
representation).
3 The "Dole Compromise' is the final provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
133 42 U.S.C § 1973(b) (1988).
134 See Barnes, supra note 38, at 1252-54. "A collision with the Congressional
prohibition against proportional representation seems inevitable so long as courts insist
on fashioning remedies" for violations of the Act. Id. at 1253.
135 See Guinier, supra note 95, at 1099. Guinier argues that under the amended Act,
the electoral process is legitimized if the percentage of blacks holding office is
"presumably reflective of the percentage of blacks within the population." Id.
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hesitant to expressly advocate proportionality." 6 However, the Court
has consistently approved the invalidation of districting plans because
there are not enough majority-minority voting districts in the plan. 1
37
Requiring that plans include more majority-minority districts than
submitted, combined with conclusive bloc voting patterns of
minorities which show that minorities will most often vote for the
minority candidate,1 31 insures that more minorities will be elected
than would have under a previously submitted plan. 139 This is the
considered result that the Court is looking for when mandating safe
districts under the Act. 140
The next step in the analysis of remedial districting is to
question the constitutional basis for requiring more proportional
representation than the "one person, one vote" principle may provide.
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the equal treatment of all
citizens, yet, it has not been enough to reject safe districting as a
statutory remedy.' 4' The Equal Protection Clause has no qualifying
words of circumstance.142  There is no mention of when an
individual's rights can be treated unequally, whether it be in a
remedial, penal, or any other situation. 43  Nonetheless, the
'3 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1980) ("The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation as an
imperative of political organization."); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973)
("It is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had
legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential.").
"' See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986).
'm "Black voting patterns reflect near unanimity in contests in which a viable black
candidate competes and in presidential contests in which blacks overwhelmingly support
the Democratic candidate." Guinier, supra note 95, at 1129-30 n.256 (citing T.
CAVANAUCIH, INSIDE BLACK AMERICA (1985)). This is because "[a] racial group is also
more likely to perceive that representatives from their own group will best represent
them." Id.
139 See Brownstein, supra note 1, at Al. The result of safe districting practices is
that there are "likely to be more minorities than ever in Congress." Id. See generally
Yanos, supra note 6, at 1831 (creating a safe district leads to success of a minority
candidate in all but a few cases thus leading to more minority representation).
140 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
141 See Howard & Howard, supra note 11, at 1654-55.
142 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
143 See id.
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unconditional guarantee of equality that is present in the Constitution
has been trumped by the. amended Voting Rights Act, a mere
congressional statute. As the next part of the analysis will explain,
safe districting, which is a form of proportional representation,
1"
transgresses the plain meaning of the Constitution, and therefore
should not be encouraged, endorsed, or required either statutorily or
judicially.
By taking notice of the concerns of the legislators involved in
the addition of the Dole Compromise to the amendments, it becomes
apparent that they too were concerned about the implications of a
remedy that could result in proportional representation. 14  After the
amendments were passed, many legislators, including Senator Orrin
Hatch of Utah, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and
also one of the most persistent critics of the amendments, 14 believed
that there would be noway to prevent proportional representation.147
The namesake of the Compromise, Senator Dole, feared that
proportional representation might result, and if it did, that it would
be "repugnant to the democratic principles upon which our society is
based. Now citizens of all races are intended to have an equal chance
of electing candidates of their choice, but if they are fairly afforded
that opportunity, and lose, the law should offer no redress." 14  In
spite of Senator Dole's statement, certain groups of citizens are being
offered the redress against which his Compromise was to protect.1 49
'4 See supra text accompanying notes 128-32.
145 See 128 CONG. REC. S6964 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
"46 See James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives
on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting RightsAct, 69 VA. L. REv. 633,
693 (1983).
147 See 128 CONG. REc. S6991 (1982) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
148 128 CONG. REC. S6941 (1982) (statement of Sen. Dole).
t9 See generally Gregory G. Ballard, Note, Application of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to Runoff Primary Election Laws, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1127, 1137 (1991)
(recognizing the reality of the conflict between the wording of the Compromise and the
actual practices that allow for, and result in, proportional representation). The Act:
[Riequires the invalidation of electoral structures that do not ensure
that minority voters can elect as many representatives as an equal
number of white voters can elect, which might be seen as amounting
to a right to proportional representation by race. On the other hand,
it explicitly disavows any such right.
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The perception that a racial minority group is not being
afforded the opportunity to have an equal chance of electing its
chosen candidate has been used to justify the unequal treatment of
those who are apparently able to absorb intentional discrimination
solely on the basis that they are members of the racial majority."'
For the members of a racial minority who feel that their votes are
being "wasted," '  as they have not been able to elect the
representative that mirrors their racial background; numerical equality
for all citizens in the representational system is not enough."12
Unequal weight is, therefore, placed upon the individual minority
voter's vote in order for a group of minorities to be able to elect their
candidate.' 53 But in doing this, the racial majority group member in
that district has the weight of his or her vote decreased, thus reducing
the chances of electing his or her candidate of choice. 54
Compromised only by the color of its skin, the racial majority loses
step with the racial minority because of the effects of a law that was
supposed to eradicate all such discrimination. 5 Therefore, if
"drawing electoral boundaries to insure success for the preferences
of white over black voters is unconstitutional, then . . the reverse
[cannot] escape constitutional condemnation. "156
1so See Barnes, supra note 38, at 1251-52. "Safe districts violate the precept that the
government must not structure the political process intentionally to deny any voter,
group, or interest an equal chance to participate in the selection of a representative."
Id. Barnes concludes that "a dilemma exists when a cure resembles the disease." Id.
See generally Guinier, supra note 3, at 1137 (explaining that wasted votes are
those cast for candidates who are not elected).
S See id. at 1141.
" See Yanos, supra note 6, at 1841-42. "One could argue strongly that safe
districting does, in fact, result in just such infringement of the rights of individuals living
in a safe district who are not members of the group favored in that district." Id.
"4 Id. at 1842. "Such individuals are at a significant disadvantage in their efforts
to raise an equally effective voice in the election as compared to the safe majority." id.
155 Id.; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966). "The Voting
Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a
century." id.
" See Fein, supra note 87, at GI.
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As defined by Black's Law Dictionary:
Gerrymander[ing] . . . [is] a name given to the
process of dividing a state or other territory into the
authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a
geographical arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior
or unlawful purpose . . . to secure a majority . . .
where the result would be otherwise if they were
divided according to obvious natural lines.
1 7
If the definition is confined to "discriminatory districting,"5 8 what is
being thrown upon racial majority members within safe districts fits
within it perfectly. 5 9 Neither the Amendments to the Constitution
that speak against discrimination on the basis of race," ° nor the
recited definition of gerrymandering suggest that the law is relaxed
when there is a majority, as opposed to a minority group member
being subjected to discrimination."16
To prove that gerrymandering occurred in the drawing of the
districts, the districting plan must have been "either motivated by
racial considerations or . . . [drawn] on racial lines [and] was the
product of a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of race."162
It has been fundamental in gerrymandering cases that the "law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose. "1,63 Furthermore, if a voting scheme
was purposefully designed in order to cancel out or minimize the
voting strength of racial groups, then the Equal Protection Clause
would be violated.'"
1s7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (6th ed. 1990).
Is "Discriminatory districting" refers only to the manipulation of district lines.
Howard M. Shapiro, supra note 99, at 196 n.39.
'" See generally Yanos, supra note 6, at 1841-42 (finding that safe districting is a
form of racial gerrymandering with respect to the individuals who are not members of
the group favored in that district.).
"6 U.S. CONST. amends. XIV & XV. "The Fifteenth amendment guarantees
nondiscrimination in the franchise irrespective of race." See Fein, supra note 87, at G1.
161 See supra text accompanying note 157.
"s Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1964).
163 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
" White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
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There appears to be a conflict with the constitutional
imperative of equal protection and the rights of those who lose under
the policy of guaranteeing minorities a certain number of minority
representatives. 65 Those who lose-individual members of the racial
majority-have their electoral influence subordinated for something
which they may or may not have had any responsibility: The fact that
a low percentage of minorities are elected." However, that fact does
not justify discriminating against whites by placing them in a district
that has been approved as guaranteeing the election of someone who
is the minority's choice.' 67 Although the situation is reversed with
respect to which racial group is being disadvantaged, the
disproportional weight being placed upon the votes of members of
different races within the safe district is uncomfortably close to the
"political apartheid" that worried Justice O'Connor in Shaw.'68
Even though it would seem that safe districting would be
beneficial to minorities by increasing their representation in the
legislature, 69 there is a danger that it may cause more factionalism
than is already present. 7 It is well settled that in this country,
members of different races have distinct cultural identities, and that,
' See generally Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993) (stating that
"gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes... threatens to carry us further from the
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth.
Amendment. . . 'embod[ies], and to which the Nation continues to aspire").
'6 See Barnes, supra note 38, at 1252. "[Nonminorities . . . feel that assuring
minorities proportional representation in every election affords them an unfair advantage
in the political process." Id.
167 See generally id. (arguing that while unremedied discrimination in districting is
not ideal, neither is the usage of safe districts because it is an intentional judicial process
that "violate[s] the precept that government must not structure the political process
intentionally to deny any voter, group, or interest an equal chance to participate in the
selection of a representative").
'" 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
'"See Howard & Howard, supra note 11, at 1629. In order to correct past
injustices against blacks, safe black districts should be created to increase the probability
that black voters will have their interests represented to a degree roughly proportional
to their presence in society. Id.
170 See Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORrrY VOTINo 270 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds. 1992).
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as a result, different races also have distinct political identities. 171 It
has been "'assume[d] that people's characteristics are a guide to the
actions they will take,'"172 and, because of this, minorities feel less
than fully represented unless members of the same minority group are
actually elected to the legislature. 1 73 Safe districting magnifies, rather
than reduces, the distinction between the voting patterns of different
races, 174 and thus "race relations [consequently] suffer. "171 This is
because the minority voter in the safe district is compelled by the
system to vote for a black candidate if there is one running. 17 If he
or she does not vote for the minority candidate, then the system
breaks down. If a minority candidate does not win in a safe district,
then there are no longer any assurances that even one minority
candidate will be elected.' 77  In Jeffers v. Clinton,17 District Judge
Garnett Thomas Eisele, in his dissenting opinion, recognized this by
stating that the Act is contributing to reshaping the ideals of the
society from "one political society" to "a nation of separate racial,
ethnic, and language political enclaves. ' 179  Segregation of racial
groups was the condition that the Voting Rights Act sought to
prevent. If it actually promotes segregation, then the Act obviously
171 See Guinier, supra note 3, at 1147. Guiner states that:
Where race has and continues to play a significant role in
determining historical outcomes, racial group membership often
serves as a political proxy for shared experience and common
interests. At least to the extent that an overwhelming majority of
group members experience a common 'group identity,' those who
are group members are more likely to represent,similar interests.
Id.
Id. (quoting HANNA F. PrTKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 89 (1967)).
"7 See id. at 114748.
17' See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority
Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 66, 77 (Bernard Grofman &
Chandler Davidson eds. 1992).
175 Carol M. Swain, Some Consequences of the Voting Rights Act, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING 295 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds. 1992).
176 See generally McDonald, supra note 174, at 77 (identifying the criticism of the
amendments to the Act in that they lead to resegregation and racial polarization that will
draw divisive lines between the races at the voting booths).
" See Fein, supra note 87, at G2. "In sum, blacks who dissent from the majority
of their race in a racially gerrymandered district lose politically." Id.
' 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
79 Id. at 227 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
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has not succeeded in its purpose. 8 Therefore, because of its
failings, alternatives to the remedy of safe districting must be chosen.
III. Alternatives to Safe Districting: Proportional
Interest Representation, Single-Transferable Voting,
and Cognizability
Because safe districting does not offer minorities the chance
for fair representation, and is contrary to the true meaning of
democracy, alternatives have been proposed that are claimed to avoid
the same problems. The alternatives are largely based upon
districting systems other than single-member districts. This Part will
analyze and explain three alternatives that have been proposed: (1)
Single-Transferable Voting; (2) Proportional Interest Representation;
and (3) Cognizable Districting.
Single-Transferable Voting is a system where "voters
throughout a state vote for any of the candidates running for election
as a representative for that state. "181 Voters may rank all or some of
the "candidates in order of their preference from [most] favorite to
least favorite."' 82  The order of preference informs the election
officers to assign the most favorite candidate first.1 83  But if the
candidate who received the highest preference already has the
requisite number of votes to win a seat in the election, then the vote
is assigned to the next favorite candidate, and so on.'" The requisite
180 See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172
(1977). "An effort to achieve proportional representation. . . might be aimed at aiding
a group's participation in the political processes by guaranteeing safe political offices,
or, on the other hand, might be a 'contrivance to segregate' the group .... " Id. at 172
(quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57 (1963)). See generally Howard &
Howard, supra note 11, at 1653 (analogizing to show that "[in essence, the net effect
of the . . .Voting Rights Act would be to move the [minority's] political role from a
participation in a pre-election campaign coalition to assured control of a few post-
election, council member positions").
181 Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional
Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991,
2000 (1991).
182 Id.
183 Yanos, supra note 6, at 1859.
184 Id.
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number needed to win a seat is calculated by "dividing the total
number of votes cast by the electorate by the number of seats
available in the legislature plus one, and adding one to the total."'
Thus, for example, if there were 10,000 votes cast in the election for
10 seats, the quota needed to be achieved to win a seat would be 910
votes in that candidate's favor. This system is designed to make the
individual's vote as "effective" as possible because his or her vote
will not be cast for someone who already has the requisite number of
votes, and that only a small number of votes will actually be cast for
a losing candidate. 86 Therefore, proponents of Single-Transferable
Voting argue, "[a]lmost every voter will have cast votes that aided
someone's election. "1
87
Proportional Interest Representation, often referred to as
cumulative voting, which is advocated by Lani Guinier, is very
similar to Single-Transferable Voting in many respects. Proportional
Interest Representation is based upon an at-large format, which
lowers the threshold for the election of representatives. 88 But instead
of requiring fifty percent of the votes to win a seat, the threshold
would be, depending on the number of open seats, more than one
percent but less than fifty percent, depending on different
considerations.1"9 All voters would then be given a certain number
"8 Id. at 1860.
18 See Daniel R. Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful
At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 150-51 (1982).
1s7 Yanos, supra note 6, at 1861. Actually:
The number of individuals whose votes do not help to elect any
candidate is generally less than the number of votes distributed over
losing candidates at the end, because some of the votes remaining at
the end have usually been transferred at some point from winning
candidates as surplus votes.
Ortiz, supra note 186, at 151 n.33.
'" See Guinier, supra note 95, at 1138.
9 id. at 1138-39 & n.297. Guinier states that:
The degree of modification necessary could be determined on a case-
by-case basis taking into consideration the local factors presently
addressed in voting rights . . . that reduced minority influence.
Alternatively, an across-the-board minimum threshold of exclusion
could be set to meet the concern that the tiniest politically cohesive
minority not be empowered merely to fragment or destabilize the
ability to govern.
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of votes, all of which could be cast for any one candidate'90 or the
votes could be spread out amongst different candidates. 191 The object
of Proportional Interest Representation is to lower the percentage of
votes necessary to be elected so as to equal the percentage of the
minority population, something that single-member districts cannot
do. 192
Guinier argues that our system is ruled by majority prejudice,
and that Proportional Interest Representation, as a remedial
mechanism, will provide electoral fairness for all constituents.1 93
Guinier further states that Proportional Interest Representation insures
that the system would be fair because voters can contribute in the
election of every representative, and racial groups can strategize so
they can best maximize their representation." 4 Additionally, this
system allows minority group members who have similar interests to
be weighed against the larger majority who may not have similar
interests.' 95 As a result, individual minority voters, whose minority
groups are of sufficient size and appeal, can actually be represented
instead of merely casting a ballot. 96 In return, those minority groups
will have a reduced perception of alienage or powerlessness.' 97
Single-Transferable Voting and Proportional Interest
Representation have their obvious advantages, but their defects are
also readily apparent. First, because the percentage of votes needed
is lower than that needed to win a seat in a single-member district,
there is the tendency for candidates to run on more narrow platforms
in order to pick up just enough support to make the quota.' 98 A
widespread push for the majority of the constituents would no longer
be necessary, which, therefore, would lead to issue-oriented
'9 Id. at 1139-n.298.
92 Id. at 1139.
29 See Guinier, supra note 3, at 1172.
'9 Guinier, supra note 95, at 1137.
id. at 1153.
195 See Ortiz, supra note 186, at 154.
96 Id. at 155.
197 Id.
I" See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan GerrymanderingandJudicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1371 (1987).
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candidates rather than constituent-minded candidates.'" This will
lead to "vote-wasting," just as is alleged in single-member districting,
because there will be a decreased need for pre-election coalition
building, thus wasting the votes of those supporters of groups who
would then be excluded from the governing coalition.2"°
Secondly, at-large districting may actually prevent minority
candidates from running for election as a result of the sheer size of
the district.2 °" Running for election in a multi-member district is
inherently more expensive because by "[i]ncreasing the size of the
electorate [it] increases campaign expenses." 2" This especially
inhibits minority candidates because they often have less money than
do their opponents. "203
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, proportional
representation systems, such as Single-Transferable Voting and
Proportional Interest Representation, do not encourage representatives
to be concerned with local concerns of the constituents in the district
that elected them. 21 On geographically-based issues, proportional
representation will not "even encourage legislators to promote their
minority group constituent's interest when those interests overlap, as
they often do, with the neighborhood-specific interests of the majority
constituents. "201 Systems such as Single-Transferable Voting and
Proportional Interest Representation are centered upon a
representative who will respond only to voters who are of the same
racial background and ultimately will be detrimental to attaining the
goal of integrating the legislature. 2°
'"' See generally id. (obtaining a majority is more difficult in proportional
representational systems and thus "encourage(s] candidates to make . . . narrow or
parochial appeals to voters").
2 Id.
201 See Ortiz, supra note 186, at 156.
2M Id.
I Id. However, minorities may not need as much money to run in a cumulative
voting system because groups will immediately identify with the candidate's interests and
will not need that much persuasion. Id.
.' See Schuck, supra note 198, at 1371-72.
20 Id. at 1372.
206 See id. at 1371 n.173. However, Schuck proposes that this problem could be
solved by "using certain localizing techniques, such as imposing residency requirements
on candidates for designated seats in multimember districts." Id.
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Bernard Grofman has proposed a concept called
"cognizability," which does not have the structural defects that both
Single-Transferable Voting and Proportional Interest Representation
have. Cognizability, as Grofman defines it, is the "ability to
characterize the district boundaries in a manner that can be readily
communicated to ordinary citizens of the district in commonsense
terms based on geographical referents. °20 7  Plans that are "non-
cognizable" would include those that violate natural geographic
boundaries, unnecessarily split local city and county lines in
egregious fashion, or sunder "proximate and contiguous natural
communities. ,20 ' Grofman suggests that "ill-compactness" would not
automatically indicate non-cognizability but rather if the district is ill-
compact, it should be able to be justified as such in commonsense
terms.
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Although cognizability is only a test to determine whether the
districting plan should be invalidated, and has not been proposed by
Grofman as a remedy, there is reason for it to be thought of as such.
Courts could interfere with a districting plan upon findings of non-
cognizability, and either order a redistricting by the legislature, or
make the plan cognizable themselves. Cognizability, because it is
based upon single-member districts, and because a strict majority of
the constituents would still be required to win a seat, would not have
the problem of issue-driven candidates who present a narrow
platform. Additionally, since cognizability is based upon single-
member districts, minorities would not be forced out of elections
because of expensive campaigns that are needed for at-large districts.
And most of all, cognizabilility would keep intact the "notion that
representation should be based on geographically defined districts 210
Geographically defined districts facilitate both the passing of
information between constituents and the mobilization of voters on
issues that they would prefer their candidates to be concerned with
"7 Grofman, supra note 56, at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Id. "[D]istricts may appear ill-compact because they follow natural geographic
boundaries (such as coastlines), or use as building blocks whole cities (or whole units
of census geography) that are themselves not especially compact, and yet are still readily
cognizable to their voters and to their legislators." Id.
210 Id. at 1262.
VOTING RIGHTS
when they consider policy changes.2" Moreover, when single-
member districts are geographically defined, there is increased
accountability for the incumbent which makes it easier to vote that
representative out of office if he is not doing a good job.2"
Conclusion
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its amendments in 1982,
were passed to reach the ideal of eliminating discrimination in the
franchise.2"3 However, the method that has been used to eliminate
discrimination pursuant to the Act is far from ideal. Minorities need
to be protected from institutional prejudice and bias, but only within
the constitutional confines of not discriminating against those who
have discriminated. This is precisely why safe districting should no
longer be approved, encouraged, or required for jurisdictions to
ensure that minorities are "fully and effectively" being represented.
There may have been an indication that the Supreme Court in Shaw
has also come to the conclusion that requiring a maximum possible
number of single-member minority districts be drawn is
unconstitutional. 2 4 But what is more likely is that safe districting
will be invalidated only in cases where the district is so bizarrely
drawn, as in Shaw, where the only apparent justification would be
race, and that race-conscious districting will still be approved in
situations not so bizarre.
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But, as argued in this Note, a more expansive invalidation of
safe districting should be employed by the Court. In addition,
alternatives that recommend at-large electoral schemes to be used as
the means for integration of the legislature should not be instituted as
solutions to the safe districting problem. Changing the system from
single-member to at-large multi-member districts has far too many
drawbacks for it to be more worthwhile than safe districting. The
system should be modified, rather than radically transformed, by
21 See id. at 1262.
212 Id.
223 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24 See Taylor, supra note 59, at 13.
21 Id.
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using the principle of cognizability. Cognizability preserves the
advantages of single-member districting while reasonably guarding
against drawing boundary lines on the basis of the color of people's
skin.
TylerJ. Kandel
